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The paper presents a theoretical model that seeks to answer the question of why former 
squatter settlements tend to upgrade/redevelop at a slower pace than otherwise similar 
settlements originating in the formal sector. We argue that squatter settlers’ initial 
strategy to access urban land creates a ‘legacy effect’ that curtails settlement upgrading 
possibilities even after the settlements are granted property titles. We test our model 
using the case of Cochabamba, Bolivia and obtain results consistent with our theoretical 
model prediction. Our results suggest that the commonly used ‘benign neglect while 
keeping the threat of eviction’ policy has profound impacts on how land is developed in 
the informal sector and this poses costly consequences for local governments after 
legalization. 
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1 Introduction 
In the last decade, several developing countries have gone through great efforts to 
legalize squatter settlements and illegal subdivisions by providing property title to 
squatters. At best, however, these titling programmes seem to have only a modest effect 
on access to loans for upgrading housing and other property. As a result, the integration 
of former illegal settlements into the city requires a generous level of direct municipal 
government involvement.  
The weak empirical relationship between title regularization and credits for upgrading 
housing presents a puzzling ‘mystery’ (Economist 2006). After all, most of these titling 
programmes were conceived following de Soto’s (1989; 2000) compelling argument 
that lack of a formal title creates a barrier to investment. Once this barrier is lifted, by 
providing clear property title, upgrading should occur at a relatively rapid pace. As a 
consequence, we should observe the upgrading of settlements originating in the 
informal sector at a faster rate than similar neighbourhoods originating in the formal 
sector once they are legalized and the threat of eviction has disappeared. The evidence, 
however, seems to contradict this prediction. Calderon (2003), for example, finds that 
less than one quarter of households receiving formal title use bank loans to upgrade 
their houses in Peru. Similarly, Galiani and Schargrodsky (2006) find that only 4 per 
cent of owners who received title obtained mortgage loans in a former squatter 
settlement in Argentina. Both of these studies report that the modest housing upgrades 
undertaken by beneficiaries of titling programmes were executed with their own 
resources, as opposed to private loans that could have financed more extensive 
improvements. Faced with this puzzle, development institutions such as the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) now advocate a ‘change in the approach’ 
towards informal settlements, arguing that mere legalization is not a sufficient condition 
for the upgrading of neighbourhoods (Brakarz et al. 2002). As a result, the IADB directs 
more resources to what they call ‘integral’ neighbourhood upgrading programmes. 
These observations of limited property upgrading after title regularization beg the 
question of why clear property title is not enough to stimulate such investments. In this 
paper, we argue that the main barrier to investment in upgrading is not solely a function 
of limited household resources or even failing credit markets. Instead, we focus on how 
property and neighbourhood characteristics at the time of neighbourhood settlement 
create legacy effects that can hinder subsequent investment in improvements. This view 
emphasizes that the strategy used by squatters to occupy land in order to avoid eviction 
affects a neighbourhood’s optimal upgrading/redevelopment timing after legal title is 
conferred. From a policy standpoint, this relationship is crucial, because it emphasizes a 
potential tie between the policies used by local governments to address informal land 
occupation and the future burden of neighbourhood upgrading.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a brief review of the 
literature on informal settlements and urban development. Taking the results of that 
literature as a point of departure, the subsequent section presents a simple model that 
explains why an informal settlement leads to legacy effects that limit future upgrading 
capacity. The penultimate section uses data from Cochabamba, Bolivia, to test the 
model predictions. The final section discusses our findings in the light of current 
policies used by local and national governments to address informal settlements.   2
2  Informal settlements and urban development 
This section surveys the theoretical literature, explaining informal settlements and urban 
development, focusing on models that predict the type of development, in terms of 
structural density, that results from the threat of confiscation or eviction. The property 
rights–urban land development nexus has been the focus of growing attention in the 
field of urban economics in recent years. Part of this literature concentrates on the 
dynamic effects of insecure property rights arising from public sources such as land use 
regulations and confiscation by governments, or private sources such as squatters and 
adverse possession. In his review of this growing literature, Turnbull (2005) argues that 
ownership risks arising from private sources (such as squatters) tend to prompt 
developers to adopt greater structural density, especially in outlying urban locations 
where the highest and best formal sector future uses call for decreasing structural 
density over time.  
Jimenez (1985) offers a second type of model to explain the behaviour of entire squatter 
communities invading government owned lands. In his model, the squatter community 
decides on the number of squatters to settle as a community. Additional members in the 
squatting community increase government’s costs of land clearance and, therefore, 
decrease the probability of eviction. At the same time, however, additional members in 
the squatting community increase the cost of providing public services and property 
upgrading once the community is settled. Jimenez (1985) concludes that greater 
government efforts to reduce squatter settlements will actually result in more populated 
squatter communities. 
A third type of model views the squatting process as an interaction between individuals 
in the squatter community and the private landowner in a dynamic context (Jimenez and 
Hoy 1991; Turnbull 2008). In the first period, the landowner holds undeveloped land 
that has an expected future value once it is developed for the formal sector in the second 
period. The greater the future expected value of the land, the more resources the owner 
will spend to secure eviction when he is ready to develop it. The squatters, however, 
invade the land in the first period, while taking into account that the landowner might 
evict them in the second period. The squatters’ investments in housing capital therefore 
reflect their anticipation of the likelihood of future eviction by the landowner. In the 
Jimenez and Hoy (1991) model, squatters respond to the eviction plans announced by 
the landowner in the first period, regardless of whether the announced strategy 
represents a credible threat by the landowner. In this setting, the landowner’s inability 
legally to collect rent from squatters prompts more frequent eviction than is efficient. 
Because squatters’ housing demands are negatively related to the perceived probability 
of eviction, the inefficiently frequent eviction by the landowner leads to lower than 
efficient levels of investment in housing by squatters. Thus, the Jimenez and Hoy 
(1991) model suggests that informal settlements with higher probabilities of eviction 
will present lower structural densities than comparable settlements with lower 
probabilities of eviction.  
Turnbull (2008), on the other hand, assumes that squatters will believe the landowner’s 
threat of eviction only if it is credible; that is, if the owner’s benefits from evicting the 
squatters in the second period actually exceed the costs. By excluding the possibility of 
non-credible threats by the landowner in the first period of the model, Turnbull (2008) 
finds a different result than Jimenez and Hoy (1991) concerning the squatter’s housing 
investment strategy. In Turnbull’s (2008) model, squatters have an incentive to over-  3
invest in housing capital, making it more costly for the landowner to implement the 
eviction strategy. This leads to greater than efficient equilibrium structural densities in 
squatter settlements.  
Navarro and Turnbull (2008) use data from Bolivia to test the prediction that the threat 
of eviction is positively related to structural density, and find results consistent with 
Turnbull’s (2008) predictions. That paper uses city blocks from an entire city to 
measure their structural density according to the legal status of the original land 
occupation, while controlling for other block characteristics that might affect structural 
density.
1 Table 1 presents some of the key results. Mainly, the threat of eviction (third 
column), which follows from the illegal land occupation strategy (second column), is 
strongly related to a settlement’s relative structural density (fourth column). In other 
words, city blocks in squatter settlements resulting from the violent confiscation of land 
(and thus having the highest relative probability of eviction) tend to have, on average, 
higher structural density than otherwise similar blocks that originated either in the 
formal sector or used other informal strategies to occupy land. Similarly, city blocks 
that originated as illegal subdivisions (thus having a lower probability of eviction than 
squatter settlements, but a higher probability of eviction than a settlement originated in 
the formal sector) have lower structural densities than otherwise similar blocks that 
originated as squatter settlements but higher densities than those that originated in the 
formal sector.  
 
Table 1: Land occupation strategies and observed structural density 
(a 







Squatter settlements 1  Violent invasion  Highest  1 
Squatter settlements 2  Illegal settlements that had some 
type of government support 
High 2 
Illegal subdivisions  Illegal land sale  Lower  3 
Formal sector development  Lawful  Lowest  4 
Notes: 
a = Adapted from Navarro and Turnbull (2008) 
 
b = For a description of each of these land occupation strategies, see this chapter’s 
section 4.2.  
                                                 
1  In a series of econometric models, Navarro and Turnbull (2008) control for location (distance from 
employment centres, geographical orientation in the city, and distance to major roads), level of city 
services (sewer system, electricity) income levels, housing tenure characteristics (percentage of owner 
occupied housing), and neighbourhood age.   4
2.1 Discussion 
Even though the property rights and urban land development connection has been the 
subject of growing attention in the urban economics literature, there is no consensus 
concerning the relationship between expected structural density and ownership risk. The 
most recent theoretical work points toward a positive relation between a threat of 
confiscation or eviction and structural density. When applied to informal settlements, 
this implies that, as illegal settlers’ perceived threat of eviction increases, the best land 
occupation strategy to avoid eviction is to increase their level of structural density at the 
time of settlement. Both Jimenez (1985) and Turnbull (2008) predict that the density of 
a squatter settlement is positively related to the vigour of the landowner’s eviction 
strategy, whether the owner is a private party or government. This prediction is 
consistent with empirical evidence from Bolivia (Navarro and Turnbull 2008). 
The positive relation between structural density and illegal settlers’ perceived threat of 
eviction is fundamental for the design of policies that deal with the illegal occupation of 
land. We return to this issue in the last section of this paper. At this point, however, it is 
worth noting that the strategies used by informal settlers have a profound effect on 
settlement characteristics (mainly structural density) which, in turn, determine the future 
capacity for upgrading. Generally, settlements that originate with high densities at the 
outset will have slower upgrading processes than settlements that originated with lower 
densities. We present a stylized model that explains the connection between initial 
settlement structural density, and subsequent timing and density of upgrading, in the 
next section.  
3  Redevelopment and upgrading of existing structures  
This section explores squatters’ upgrading/redevelopment decisions after they gain 
formal ownership rights to the land they occupy.
2 We begin the analysis by recognizing 
that the decision to redevelop or improve property involves expectations about the 
property’s most profitable use in the future. Since urban growth and economic 
development are inherently dynamic processes, agents maximize land value by 
choosing the time and type of development they put on their property, basing their 
decisions on expectations of the city’s future growth. Different plots of land will have 
different current and future development options, depending on their location in the 
urban area. For this reason, we explore informal settlement upgrading after title 
regularization using a partial equilibrium model of land development based on a 
standard spatial dynamic framework developed in a series of papers by Fujita (1982), 
Wheaton (1982), and Turnbull (1988). While the original formulation of the Fujita–
Wheaton–Turnbull (FWT) model treats location explicitly, we focus on individual plots 
of land, and can therefore suppress location notation without loss of generality. The two 
applications here follow the approach developed in Turnbull (2005), which reconciles 
the FWT and Anderson (1986) land development models.  
                                                 
2  One of the most common ways for squatters to obtain ownership rights is through government 
sponsored title regularization programmes. For the purposes of this paper, however, the legal 
procedures squatters use to gain full ownership rights of the plots they occupy is irrelevant.     5
We use the model to explore two different decisions faced by squatters once they obtain 
formal property rights to the land they occupy: 
•  A redevelopment decision that entails the replacement of an existing structure 
with a new one; and  
•  An upgrading decision that entails investing in additional capital to alter the 
existing structure to improve quality.  
3.1  The redevelopment decision  
Consider a residential land user facing the decision to redevelop his or her property after 
a land title regularization programme has granted the individual the property rights 
recognized by law.
3 Suppose the property has an existing structure of given quality at 
the time the property is regularized and formal title issued to the squatter. For 
convenience, the ‘current’ time period is indexed to 0.  
If the owner wants to redevelop the land, he or she must clear the land and incur the 
demolition cost D(So), which is an increasing function of the current or existing 
structural density, So. Of course, a greater structural density of surrounding properties 
might also increase the difficulty of demolition of a given property by decreasing open 
working space in which to complete the demolition with minimal risk to neighbouring 
structures. In such cases, greater neighbourhood structural density also increases 
demolition costs for a given property. Neighbouring structural density effects, however, 
do not affect our general conclusions, so we suppress them here. Once the land is 
cleared, the cost of constructing the new structure of quality Q is C(Q). Greater quality 
increases construction costs. Since the land is cleared by demolition prior to rebuilding, 
the pre-existing structural density So does not affect the construction cost for the new 
structure.  
Following Turnbull (2005), the redevelopment decision, how to redevelop (that is, at 
what structural density and quality), and when to redevelop can be separated into the 
interlacing density and timing decisions. First, consider the highest and best use for the 
property if redeveloped at time T. The function Q(T) represents the optimal structural 
quality for the property owner to pursue if constrained to redevelop at T. This highest 
and best use is the new configuration that maximizes the present value of land profit 
from time T onwards, balancing the marginal benefit of quality (the present value of 
incremental expected future land rents) with the marginal cost of construction. We 
assume that the demanded quality (reflecting the best and highest use at T) is rising over 
time, so that the optimal quality curve Q(T) in the top panel in Figure 1 is upward 
sloped. Once the optimal redevelopment time has been chosen, the optimal 
redevelopment configuration can be read from the top panel in the figure.  
Now consider the owner’s optimal time to redevelop the property. Taking into account 
the highest and best use at each T, the marginal benefit of delaying redevelopment 
beyond T is the value of postponing the demolition and construction costs, or MBT = 
                                                 
3  The mainstream law and economics literature defines property rights as a bundle of rights accruing to 
an individual relative to a particular asset that include the right to use the property, exclude others 
from using the property, and dispose of the property.    6
r[D(So) + C(Q(T))] for interest rate r. The marginal cost of delaying redevelopment is 
the foregone higher land rent from the redeveloped property over and above the lower 
land rent from the existing configuration, or MCT = R(Q(T),T) - Ro. These MBT and MCT 
functions are depicted in the bottom panel of Figure 1.
4 The optimal redevelopment time 
for a particular property is when the marginal benefit of delay equals the marginal cost, 
which is at time T* in Figure 1. Given this optimal redevelopment time, the optimal 
quality of the replacement structure is Q(T*) in the upper panel.  
So, what does this framework imply for a legalized squatter settlement? As explained 
earlier, as part of their survival strategy, informal settlements tend to have higher 
structural densities than settlements originated in the formal sector (Navarro and 
Turnbull 2008; Turnbull 2008). Therefore, for land originally settled by squatters, the 
greater initial structural density translates into higher demolition costs, which, in turn, 
increase the benefit of holding off on property improvements a little longer (MBT shifts 
rightward in Figure 1).
5 This means that property owners in former (but now legalized) 
squatter settlements will tend to hold off their redevelopment decision for longer periods 
than owners of property that originated in the formal sector; in Figure 1, land originally 
developed in the formal sector is redeveloped at T* while land originally settled 
informally is redeveloped at T**. This implies that, for properties originally developed 
at the same time, formally settled property will be more likely to be redeveloped at a 
higher quality sooner than informally settled property.  
Assuming that housing quality is a normal good, property in what were originally 
informal settlements serves lower income households, which is reflected in a lower land 
rental return to quality. Thus, under normality, we expect the optimal quality curve for 
informally settled neighbourhoods to be below the optimal quality curve for formally 
settled neighbourhoods. In the top panel of Figure 1, Q(T)’ pertains to the informally 
settled property, with Q(T**)’ < Q(T*) illustrating a lower quality of redeveloped 
property for informal settlements when compared with similarly situated formal 
settlements.  
To summarize, at any given time, property in former squatter settlements is less likely to 
have been redeveloped and, if redeveloped, is more likely to be redeveloped to a lesser 
quality than property that was legally settled. 
 
                                                 
4  The slopes of the curves follow immediately from the construction cost function properties and the 
assumption that land rent for redeveloped property is rising relative to the land rent for the existing 
configuration over time. This last condition is necessary for redevelopment ever to occur. See 
Turnbull (2005) for formal analysis of a similar framework.  
5  If the lower quality of the initial construction also leads to lower land rent from the existing 
configuration, then Ro is lower as well. This decreases the marginal cost of waiting, further increasing 
T**.    7
Figure 1: Legacy title effect on redevelopment timing (T) and quality (Q) 
 
3.2  The decision to upgrade existing property  
While redevelopment is an option open to squatters after a regularization programme, 
they can also choose to upgrade the structure they had when granted formal title by 
adding additional housing capital. If upgrading is chosen, as opposed to redevelopment, 
the property owner faces upgrading costs that depend on the additional housing capital 
being added to the existing structure, as well as the structure and quality of construction 
already in place. This modifies the construction cost function to C(Q,So) with ∂C/∂Q > 0 
and  ∂C/∂So > 0. Substituting this revised construction cost function into the above 
model and setting demolition costs equal to 0, the model predicts a pattern of property 
upgrading that resembles the redevelopment pattern derived above. Informally settled 
properties are upgraded later than their formally settled counterparts, and are upgraded 
more modestly than property in formally settled areas.  
The model explains the relationship between the initial structural density of settlements 
and subsequent redevelopment/upgrading patterns. Coupled with the insights presented 
in the previous section, the framework also explains why informal settlements tend to 
redevelop/upgrade at a slower and lower rate than otherwise similar settlements that 
originated in the formal sector. We test this predicted relationship in the next section.    8
4  Data and empirical models 
This section uses data from Cochabamba, Bolivia, to test the theoretical model proposed 
in the previous section.
6 We begin with a brief history of the case study, the city of 
Cochabamba, and continue with a description of the data and econometric model used 
to test the theoretical propositions. We conclude the section with a discussion of the 
empirical findings.  
4.1 Cochabamba 
The city of Cochabamba was founded in 1574 as a centre of food production and 
shipment to serve the colonial mining industry in the western part of Bolivia. Situated at 
8,360 feet (2,550 metres) above sea level on the fertile lands of the low valley region of 
the state of Cochabamba, the city is currently the third largest in the country. 
Cochabamba’s first significant urban expansion occurred during 1900–1950, when the 
city began accommodating a large wave of rural migrants seeking to escape the 
conditions of their farm life (Solares 1990). This rapid growth prompted the need for a 
comprehensive growth plan to regulate the pace of development. By 1946, municipal 
authorities responded with a plan to regulate development over the next 50 years 
(Goldstein 2004). But the plan could not contain the city’s rapid population growth or 
the pressure this growth put on the land available for formal development. Thus, by 
1951 the city experienced its first wave of illegal land invasions in the south-eastern part 
of the city.  
Municipal authorities reacted to these land invasions with forceful evictions; but many 
squatters persisted. Soon, with varying degrees of success, other land invasions took 
place in other parts of the city. Between 1945 and 1976, about 10 per cent of the land 
being developed in Cochabamba was occupied by illegal means, either through land 
invasions or illegal subdivision of rural land. 
Since the 1970s, the central government and its housing ministry have tried to ease the 
city’s housing problem by enacting public programmes that provided land for the poor 
at affordable prices. However, these programmes proved to be highly ineffective and 
extremely costly due, in part, to corrupt administration (Solares and Bustamante 1986). 
In most cases, these programmes were reduced to simple regularization actions of 
previously illegally settled plots of land (Goldstein 2004). 
Between 1976 and 1992, the city experienced its highest population growth rates due to 
a second wave of rural urban migration taking place in the country as a whole. During 
this period, the city grew by about 2780 hectares, of which 30 per cent was developed in 
the informal sector. Most of the illegal growth that took place in this period can be 
attributed to loteadores (illegal land brokers) subdividing agricultural land or protected 
forest and selling it against municipal regulations as urban land. The municipal 
government’s first reaction to this practice was to bulldoze illegal construction, but the 
                                                 
6  It is important to note that empirical results obtained using case of Cochabamba might not be similar 
to empirical results obtained in other urban contexts around the world. The theoretical model 
presented in the previous section is, however, general enough to be tested in other urban areas.    9
pervasiveness and magnitude of this type of illegal development made this policy 
extremely costly in terms of economic resources and political capital (Solares 1999). 
To this day, illegal land subdivision remains one of the main means by which that land 
is developed in Cochabamba. Between 1992 and 2001, about 70 per cent of urban land 
was developed under this modality. Over time, a large portion of old, illegal land 
subdivisions and virtually all of the squatter settlements have been legalized through 
many regularization and titling programmes. In 2002, a new programme giving title to 
land was enacted in order to regularize newly created illegal settlements. Following the 
same lines as previous programmes that had granted title, the central government 
promised that this would be the last such effort. Given the previous history of such 
programmes, however, it is not surprising that this announcement has not slowed the 
rapid pace of illegal growth (Farfan 2004). 
4.2  Data and econometric specification 
The data are drawn from the 1992 and 2001 censuses collected by the Bolivian National 
Institute of Statistics (INE, in Spanish) for a sample of city blocks. The theoretical 
model predicts that home redevelopment/upgrading within a settlement is a function of 
that settlement’s legal origin (land occupation strategy), among other settlement 
characteristics that are believed to be associated with home upgrading/redevelopment. 
More formally, we express this relation as an equation: 
ΔQi = α + si β + Δx’iδ + y’iζ + z’iθ + εi   (1) 
where ΔQi captures the change in homes from low quality to high quality in city block i 
in a determined period of time t; s is an indicator of block i’s land occupation strategy, 
Δx is a vector of block i’s characteristics changing in time period t and believed to affect 
its housing quality; y is a vector of location attributes for block i; z is a vector of block 
attributes at the beginning of time period t believed to affect the change in housing 
quality for block i during time t; ε is a random disturbance term, and β, δ, ζ, and θ are 
parameters to be estimated by the model. 
The dataset allows us to observe the changes in a sample of 1217 city blocks over a time 
span of a span of 9 years (that is, t = 9). Our dependent variable is the difference 
between the percentage of high quality houses in both 1992 and 2001. We apply the 
definition of housing quality used by the Bolivian National Institute of Statistics to 
obtain comparable measures of quality in 1992 and 2001.
7 
The key variable of interest is the legal origin of a block’s settlement. In the case of 
Cochabamba, we identify four types of settlements according to their legal origin:
8 
•  Legal settlements, which include settlements developed in accordance with all 
existing laws and regulations 
                                                 
7  See the Appendix, for a detailed definition of the housing quality variables.  
8 A ll of the informal settlements included in this empirical study were regularized in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s.   10
•  Squatter settlements, which encompass settlements that originated as land 
invasions by breaking the laws of property, and municipal laws or land use 
regulations 
•  Illegal land subdivisions, which involve settlements in which the land was 
purchased legally but developed in violation of municipal laws of urbanism 
•  Government supported settlements, which constitute settlements that developed, 
in most cases, in violation of urbanism and property laws but had a level of 
support from the housing ministry.
9  
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variables N Mean Std  dev. 
    
Settlement legal origin*   
Squatters 1217 0.18 0.39 
Govt supported settlement  1217 0.10 0.30 
Illegal subdivision  1217 0.13 0.33 
Formal sector development  1217 0.59 0.49 
   
Change from 1992–2001 variables (%)  
High quality homes  1217 7.91 18.44 
Homes with sewer system  1217 35.36 36.44 
Owner occupied homes 1217 -2.54 21.83 
Number of homes  1217 5.23 10.12 
   
Block characteristics in 1992 (%)   
Homes of high quality  1217 30.35 31.72 
Individuals with college degree  1217 2.08 4.09 
   
Location characteristics  
Distance from CBD (km) 1217 3.92 1.49 
Distance to a major road (km)  1217 0.44 0.32 
   
Neighbourhood age*  
Consolidated between 1574–1812 1217 0.01 0.09 
Consolidated between 1812–1900 1217 0.00 0.07 
Consolidated between 1900–45 1217 0.08 0.27 
Consolidated between 1945–76 1217 0.36 0.48 
Consolidated between 1976–92 1217 0.55 0.50 
* Binary indicators 
 
                                                 
9  This type of development involves settlements that invaded or illegally purchased land but had the 
support of a government official in the housing ministry after the actual taking of the land. In that   11
In order to isolate the effect of a block’s legal origin on its capacity to upgrade, we 
control for the percentage of high quality houses in the block and the percentage of 
college graduates living in the block in 1992. This allows us to measure the effect of a 
block’s legal origin on its capacity to upgrade by comparing blocks that start with the 
same level of resident education and housing quality in 1992. In the same manner, we 
use other changes in block characteristics that might affect the change in housing 
quality within a block over time. These included the change in the percentage of homes 
connected to the sewerage system, the change in the percentage of owner occupied 
homes, and the change in the total number of homes in the block. 
Finally, we also include some location characteristics thought to have an impact on the 
change in housing quality, such as distance from the central business district (CBD), the 
age of the neighbourhood, and its distance from a major road. Table 2 reports 
descriptive statistics for all variables included in the analysis. 
4.3 Results 
Table 3 presents results from our econometric model. The third and fourth columns 
present OLS estimates, and their robust t statistics, respectively. Coefficients on the 
control variables are consistent with mainstream land development literature. Other 
things being equal, blocks that started with a higher percentage of high quality homes in 
1992 tend to have a lower change in the percentage of high quality homes in the 1992–
2001 period. City blocks that started with more educated individuals in 1992 had a 
higher change in the percentage of high quality homes over the period 1992–2001, a 
result consistent with the assumption that housing quality is a normal good. As 
expected, older city blocks also tend to have a slower change in the percentage of high 
quality homes in the 1992–2001 period. The same tendency is observed for blocks 
located far from the CBD and those located at greater distance from a major road.  
Our indicators of legal origin are all negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 
level. The reference group for the set of binary variables reflecting legal origin is 
‘blocks originated in the formal sector’. Thus, each coefficient in the legal origin set of 
variables could be interpreted as the difference in the rate of change in percentage of 
high quality homes during 1992–2001 between blocks in each of the respective informal 
origin categories and those that originated in the formal sector. The estimates show that 
city blocks that originated as squatter settlements (violent land invasions), on average, 
increased their percentage of high quality homes at a rate of 17.42 percentage points 
lower than otherwise similar blocks that originated in the formal sector. Similarly, 
blocks that originated as illegal subdivisions (illegal land sales), on average, increased 
their percentage of high quality homes at rate of 5.85 percentage points lower than that 
of otherwise similar blocks originated in the formal sector. 
The negative sign on the coefficients for our main variables of interest follow our 
theoretical model predictions. Overall, settlements originated in the informal sector tend 
to upgrade at a slower pace than otherwise similar settlements originated in the formal 
sector. The coefficient magnitudes also follow our theoretical prediction. The negative 
                                                                                                                                               
sense, their strategy was somewhat similar to that of the squatters, but required lower structural 
density than a squatter settlement to avoid eviction.    12
legacy effect for upgrading is stronger for squatter settlements (-17.2) than it is for 
government supported informal settlements (-8.77) and informal subdivisions (-5.84).  
 
Table 3: OLS regression results 
Change in % of high quality homes 1992–2001     
 Estimate  t
a 
Squatters -17.42  -11.16 
Govt supported settlement  -8.77  -5.66 
Illegal subdivision  -5.84  -3.75 
Change in homes with sewer system, 1992–2001 (%)  0.05  3.35 
Change in owner occupied homes, 1992–2001 (%)  0.02  0.54 
Change in the number of homes 1992–2001 (%)  -0.05  -0.64 
High quality homes in 1992 (%)  -0.40  -16.11 
Individuals with college degree in 1992 (%)  1.02  5.55 
Distance to a major road (km)  -2.62  -1.5 
Distance from CBD (km)  -2.55  -3.8 
Consolidated between 1574–1812  1.29  0.27 
Consolidated between 1812–1900  -3.86  -0.87 
Consolidated between 1900–45  -0.22  -0.09 
Consolidated between 1945–76  -4.50  -2.9 
   
Constant 33.87  8.74 
Number of observations (city blocks)  1217   
R-squared 0.27   
Note:
 aHeteroscedasticity robust.  
5 Discussion 
Over the past 50 years, governments in developing countries have applied different 
combinations of policies to deal with the rapidly growing presence of slums in urban 
areas. In Latin America, for example, squatter policies ranged from virtual neglect until 
the 1950s, to forceful evictions during military regimes during the 1970s and 1980s, to a 
current policy characterized by relative tolerance and eviction followed by programmes 
of regularization (the granting of title to land) for settlements that survived attempts at 
eviction (Solares 1999; Smolka 2003).    13
Some studies find that issuing property titles to informal owners improves beneficiaries’ 
wellbeing. Studies in Peru and Argentina show that owners of informal settlements 
receiving property titles tend to have relatively higher housing quality and better child 
education (Galiani and Schargrodsky 2006), better child health (Galiani and 
Schargrodsky 2004), and greater labour supply than informal settlers with no formal 
property title (Field 2003); interestingly, however, there is no strong evidence of a 
positive relationship between formal title provision and greater access to bank loans 
(Calderon 2003; Galiani and Schargrodsky 2006). Further, evidence from Peru and 
Argentina also shows that housing upgrades undertaken by beneficiaries of titling 
programmes tended to be modest, and are accomplished by drawing from household 
resources rather than loans that could have financed more significant improvements 
(Calderon 2003; Galiani and Schargrodsky 2006).  
These and other studies are now being portrayed as evidence of a missing link between 
formal titles and access to financial markets and, therefore, a big weakness in the 
philosophy of large-scale, de Soto-style titling programmes (Economist 2006). This 
paper provides additional evidence regarding the relationship between the legal status of 
the original development, and subsequent redevelopment and upgrading. The theoretical 
model helps explain why beneficiaries of titling programmes tend to withhold 
significant investment when upgrading their property longer than their counterparts in 
formal settlements. The model shows that, the greater the initial density of development 
in a settlement, the longer the optimal time for redevelopment/upgrading tends to be. It 
predicts that squatter settlements that go through a title regularization programme will 
not make investment in serious upgrading or redevelopment at the same rate that 
property originated in the formal sector does, largely because they originate with a 
greater density of lower quality housing. Our empirical study finds this redevelopment 
and upgrading pattern for Cochabamba, Bolivia. Thus, the model identifies one reason 
why former squatters do not rely on bank loans to upgrade their properties to the same 
extent as owners of formally originated property.  
5.1 Policy  implications 
Our findings raise serious concerns about the practice of relative tolerance towards 
informal development. Keeping a threat of eviction latent with the possibility of 
granting a title to those settlements that avoid eviction creates incentives that can lead to 
negative future consequences. As explained by the theoretical models in the second 
section of this paper, the threat of eviction induces squatters to over-invest in housing 
capital in order to reduce the credible threat of eviction, and to increase the likelihood of 
receiving formal title in the future. However, our model suggests that this strategy 
creates a legacy effect that leads owners to postpone large investments in upgrading 
housing for longer periods of time. As a result, the incentives created by current policies 
drive future squatters to build high density and low quality housing, and curtails the 
incentive to upgrade their property after they receive title for these properties. In a 
sense, a policy that seems benevolent and pro-poor in the long run has adverse effects 
for poverty alleviation strategies, and increases future local government costs of 
integrating these settlements into their surrounding urban areas. It is important to note 
that this research does not question titling programmes per se. Nonetheless, it raises 
questions about the costs of a policy that combines relative tolerance towards squatter 
settlements with the expectation of title in terms of future quality of housing for the 
poor.   14
This paper raises an issue previously ignored when designing policies to enhance land 
access for the poor. It shows important negative legacy effects of informal settlements 
in terms of long-term living conditions for the poor, and upgrading costs faced by local 
governments. These findings call for a shift in policy concerning informal settlements 
from a ‘dealing with informal settlements’ paradigm to a ‘helping the poor obtain 
housing in the formal sector’ paradigm. This shift, in turn, calls for innovative tools to 
acquire and develop land that can subsequently be accessed by the poor, or a ‘get ahead 
of the curve approach’. This paper does not present policy prescriptions for dealing with 
existing or potential informal settlements. However, in terms of legacy effects that 
undermine potential future upgrading that have so far been overlooked in the 
mainstream urban land and housing policy literature, our findings highlight some of the 
costs associated with the current policies of relative tolerance followed by 
regularization. It also offers a novel empirical study of how informal development 
strategies shape urban form in developing countries. This represents an important 
contribution for the design of effective policy that enhances land access for the urban 
poor, and to the understanding of the mechanisms through which property rights affect 
economic development in general.  
Appendix 
Construction of the housing quality variable 
For the purpose of this paper, housing quality refers exclusively to construction 
materials employed in the housing structure. Construction materials are classified into 
low, medium or high quality, using the Bolivian National Institute of Statistics as shown 
in Table A1. The next step is to construct a set of housing quality variables that reflect 
the percentage of houses in a city block in the high, medium, or low classification 
according to the construction materials employed in the housing structure. We classify 
houses with high quality materials in at least two parts of their structure as high quality 
houses. Similarly, houses with low quality materials in at least one part of their structure 
are classified as low  quality houses. Finally, all houses in neither the high nor low 
quality categories are classified as medium quality houses. The same methodology and 
material quality classification is used for both 1992 and 2001 censuses in order to 
construct our dependent variable. 
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Table A1: Classification of housing construction quality by main materials 
used in walls, roof, and floors 
Quality  Wall materials  Roof materials  Floor materials 








Zinc plates  Brick 
Cement 
  
Low  Adobe (not covered) 
Cane, palma 
Other 




   16
References 
Anderson, J.E. (1986). ‘Property Taxes and the Timing of Urban Land Development’. 
Regional Science and Urban Economics, 16, 483–92. 
Brakarz, J., Greene, M., and Rojas, E. (2002). ‘Cities for All: Recent Experiences with 
Neighborhood Upgrading Programs’. Washington, DC: Inter American Development 
Bank. 
Calderon, C.J. (2003). ‘Formalizacion de la Propiedad, Cultura Registral y Credito en el 
Peru’. A Cidade Da Informalidade: O Desafio Das Cidades Latino-Americanas, P. 
Abramo. Rio de Janeiro: Lincoln Institute, Livraria Sette Letras, FAPERJ. 
de Soto, H. (2000). The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and 
Fails Everywhere Else. New York: Basic Books. 
de Soto, H., and Instituto Libertad y Democracia (Lima Perú) (1989). The Other Path: 
The Invisible Revolution in the Third World. New York: Harper & Row. 
Economist, The (2006). ‘The Mystery of Capital Deepens’. 26 August. 
Farfan, F. (2004). ‘Formal and Customary Housing Tenure Initiatives in Bolivia’. 
Habitat International, 28(2): 221–30. 
Field, E. (2003). ‘Entitled to Work: Urban Property Rights and Labor Supply in Peru’. 
Princeton: Princeton University, Mimeo. 
Fujita, M. (1982). ‘Spatial Patterns of Residential Development’. Journal of Urban 
Economics, 12: 22–52. 
Galiani, S., and Schargrodsky, E. (2004). ‘Effects of Land Titling on Child Health’. 
Economics & Human Biology, 2(3): 353–72. IADB Research Network Working 
Paper R-491. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank. 
Galiani, S., and Schargrodsky, E. (2006). ‘Property Rights for the Poor: Effects of Land 
Titling’. Working Paper. Buenos Aires: Universidad Torcuato di Tella, Centro de 
investigación en finanzas, May.  
Goldstein, D.M. (2004). The Spectacular City: Violence and Performance in Urban 
Bolivia. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Jimenez, E. (1985). ‘Urban Squatting and Community Organization in Developing 
Countries’. Journal of Public Economics, 27: 69–92. 
Jimenez, E., and Hoy M. (1991). ‘Squatter’s Rights and Urban Development’. 
Economica, 58(229): 79–92. 
Navarro, I.A. and Turnbull, G.K. (2008). ‘Squatter Settlement and Urban 
Development’. URAG Working Paper 08-06. Atlanta, GA: Georgia State University. 
Available at: www.aysps.gsu.edu/urag/ 
Smolka, M.O. (2003). ‘Regularizacao da Ocupacao do Solo Urbano: A Solucao que e 
parte do Problema, O Problema que e Parte da Solucao’, A Cidade Da 
Informalidade: O Desafio Das Cidades Latino-Americanas. P. Abramo. Rio de 
Janeiro: Lincoln Institute, Livraria Sette Letras, FAPERJ.   17
Solares, H. (1990). Historia, Espacio, y Sociedad: Cochabamba 1550-1950: 
Formación, Crisis y Desarrollo de su Proceso Urbano. Cochabamba: Centro de 
Investigación y Desarrollo Regional (CIDRE). 
Solares, H. (1999). Vivienda y Estado: Politicas Habitacionales y Produccion del 
Habitat Popular en America Latina. Cochabamba: Editorial Serrano. 
Solares, H., and Bustamante, F. (eds) (1986). Crisis Urbana y Barrios Populares: El 
Caso de Alalay, Ticiti, y Valle Hermoso. Cochabamba: Editorial Universitaria. 
Turnbull, G.K. (1988). ‘Residential Development in an Open City’. Regional Science 
and Urban Economics, 18: 307–20. 
Turnbull, G.K. (2005). ‘The Investment Incentive Effects of Land Use Regulations’. 
Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 31(4): 357–96. 
Turnbull, G.K. (2008). ‘Squatting, Eviction, and Development’. Regional Science and 
Urban Economics, 38(1): 1–15. 
Wheaton, W.C. (1982). ‘Urban Spatial Development with Durable but Replaceable 
Capital’. Journal of Urban Economics, 3: 3–36. 
 
 
 